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Raila Cinda Brejt* 
 
Technological developments change the way we perform tasks 
by creating more efficient solutions to old problems and giving rise 
to opportunities not previously possible. Advances in communica-
tions technology have made the world feel smaller and more acces-
sible. These changes also affect the methodology of both criminal 
activity and the investigative procedures of law enforcement. Our 
fundamental rights are challenged as judges and state actors try to 
strike the perfect balance between longstanding values and contem-
porary problems. This Note considers the Fifth Amendment chal-
lenges that arise when law enforcement attempts to obtain evidence 
from a criminal defendant’s encrypted device. This Note will argue 
that the application of the foregone conclusion doctrine of the Fifth 
Amendment should require the government to show independent 
knowledge of the contents of the device that they seek prior to courts 
granting decryption compulsion orders of the criminal defendant’s 
personal device. Biometric decryption should be considered the 
same as password encryption and distinguished from the physical 
act exceptions to the protections of the Fifth Amendment. To pre-
serve the protections of the Fifth Amendment, we must resist the de-
velopment of ambiguous and abridged doctrines that carry the po-
tential to swallow our fundamental rights. 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2021; M.A., New York 
University, 2012; B.S., City University of New York, Brooklyn College, 2010. Thank you 
to Professor Daniel J. Capra for your advice and insightful comments. Additionally, thank 
you to the Fordham Intellectual Property Law Journal Executive Board, especially Sara 
Mazurek, for your feedback, time, and encouragement throughout this process. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Computers, tablets, and smart phones are museums of their own-
ers’ minds as these devices record the users’ social media, shopping, 
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and online dating habits while tracking location, health information, 
political affiliation, and so on.1 The longer a person owns and uti-
lizes their device, the more information the device has stored about 
the user. But users like to think they can keep their information away 
from the hands of others by encrypting it. In most circumstances, 
this should be sufficient. However, in the event that a person has a 
run-in with the law, it may become more complicated. 
Professors Orin Kerr, of Berkley Law, and Bruce Schneier,  
security technologist, note that encryption technology has become 
widespread in recent years.2 In the event that the government seeks 
evidence from a suspect’s decrypted device, government investiga-
tors need to find an encryption workaround to convert the encrypted 
data from the encrypted digital devices to a decrypted and readable 
format.3 Kerr and Schneier discuss six types of encryption worka-
rounds;4 this Note will focus solely on what they refer to as “com-
pelling the key,”5 wherein the government orders an individual  
to decrypt a device that is suspected or known to be under the  
dominion of a particular individual.6 This method of decryption  
implicates Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, which is currently inad-
equate for protecting criminal defendants, as the doctrine is not fully 
fleshed out. 
 
1 Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 396 (2014) (“Mobile application software on a cell 
phone, or ‘apps,’ offer a range of tools for managing detailed information about all aspects 
of a person’s life. There are apps for Democratic Party news and Republican Party news; 
apps for alcohol, drug, and gambling addictions; apps for sharing prayer requests; apps for 
tracking pregnancy symptoms; apps for planning your budget; apps for every conceivable 
hobby or pastime; apps for improving your romantic life. There are popular apps for buying 
or selling just about anything, and the records of such transactions may be accessible on 
the phone indefinitely. There are over a million apps available in each of the two major app 
stores; the phrase ‘there’s an app for that’ is now part of the popular lexicon. The average 
smart phone user has installed 33 apps, which together can form a revealing montage of 
the user’s life.”). 
2 Orin S. Kerr & Bruce Schneier, Encryption Workarounds, 106 GEO. L.J. 989, 990 
(2018). 
3 Id. at 990–91.  
4 Id. at 996. 
5 Id. at 1000. 
6 Id. 
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Furthermore, the usage of biometrics,7 in place of a password, 
adds to the complexity of modernizing the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege. Biometric decryption technology has existed for some time, 
but on September 19, 2013, Apple Inc.’s sale of the iPhone 5 pro-
vided biometric decryption technology to the average consumer.8 
Unfortunately, our Fifth Amendment rights are at risk until it is le-
gally determined how they interact with law enforcements’ method-
ologies. It is important that the Fifth Amendment be construed lib-
erally to protect defendants from the depreciation of their constitu-
tional rights against self-incrimination.9 
Part I of this Note will introduce the current binding precedent, 
as well as some gaps which lower courts have attempted to fill in. 
Part II considers the State v. Stahl case, with some of its problematic 
progeny, showing how radically the foregone conclusion doctrine 
can be misconstrued. Part III advocates that a password should not 
be considered a foregone conclusion based solely on showing own-
ership of the device and that the government must show independent 
knowledge of the evidence they seek prior to acquiring a compulsion 
order. To properly safeguard criminal defendants’ constitutional 
rights, courts must adopt the narrowest interpretation of any doctrine 
which puts the defendants’ rights in jeopardy. 
 
7 Maria Korolov, What Is Biometrics? 10 Physical and Behavioral Identifiers That Can 
Be Used for Authentication, CSO (Feb. 12, 2019, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.csoonline.com/article/3339565/what-is-biometrics-and-why-collecting-
biometric-data-is-risky.html [https://perma.cc/3M8A-M4XT] (defining biometrics as 
“physical or behavioral human characteristics…[which] can be used to digitally identify a 
person to grant access to systems, devices or data” including fingerprint ID and facial 
recognition). 
8 Kara Goldman, Biometric Passwords and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 
33 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 211, 212 (2015). 
9 Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921) (“It has been repeatedly decided 
that [the Fifth Amendment] should receive a liberal construction, so as to prevent stealthy 
encroachment upon or ‘gradual depreciation’ of the rights secured by [it], by imperceptible 
practice of courts or by well-intentioned but mistakenly over-zealous executive officers.”). 
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I. WHERE IT ALL BEGINS: CONTEXT FOR THE CLASH OF TECHNOLOGY AND 
THE LAW 
A. Encryption, Passwords, and Biometrics 
The government will often seek to obtain evidence from a sus-
pect’s digital device to link the suspect to the crime.10 These digital 
devices—such as computers, tablets, and cell phones—carry a vast 
array of information that can reveal a rather intimate understanding 
of the user’s hobbies, views, and relationships.11 However, any con-
tent that is stored on digital devices can be encrypted.12 Encryption 
utilizes an algorithm to convert information into a format that cannot 
be read or accessed.13 Decryption involves causing the algorithm to 
be performed in the reverse to unscramble the data and make it read-
able to the device holder.14 The device’s encryption key must be 
triggered to reverse the algorithm.15 This key is established and pre-
programmed into the device by the device manufacturer.16 The de-
vice user does not know the preprogrammed decryption key in the 
device’s operating system, which controls the encryption process; 
rather, users who wish to encrypt their device can set their own pass-
word which serves to trigger the device to provide the decryption 
key.17 Once the user enters their password into the digital device, the 
password decrypts the key, which in turn decrypts the actual content 
on the digital device.18 Therefore, in order to access data stored on 
an encrypted digital device, a device holder must know the device’s 
password. 
Consumers can use their physical biometric features to avoid en-
tering the password to decrypt their various devices equipped with 
these capabilities.19 Biometric feature decryption utilizes scans of 
 
10 Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 379 (2014). 
11 Id. at 396–97. 
12 Kerr & Schneier, supra note 2, at 993. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 994–95. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 994. 
18 Id. at 994–95. 
19 United States v. Sealed Warrant, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147836, at *11 (N.D. Cal. 
Aug. 16, 2019). 
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the user’s face, eye, or fingerprint.20 In order to set up biometric de-
cryption, the user must first set a password on the device.21 When 
presented with the correct biometric features, these features trigger 
the digital device to utilize the user-established password to decrypt 
the device’s decryption key, which subsequently decrypts the digital 
device.22 
B. “I Plead the Fifth”: Fifth Amendment Protections 
The goal of the right against self-incrimination is “to avoid con-
fronting the witness with the ‘cruel trilemma’ of self-accusation, 
perjury or contempt.”23 The essence of the cruel trilemma is forcing 
the defendant to “communicate an express or implied assertion of 
fact or belief” where the defendant’s choices are limited to “truth, 
falsity, or silence” and suffering the consequences of their choice.24 
To avoid confessions obtained by cruel treatment,25 the Fifth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution protects a person from 
being compelled to act as a “witness against himself.”26 The three 
elements of the Fifth Amendment privilege are: “(1) compulsion of 
a (2) testimonial communication that is (3) incriminating.”27 Tradi-
tionally, the Fifth Amendment privilege has served to prohibit the 
government from compelling a criminal defendant to take the stand 
and say things against their own penal interest or to force them to 
incriminate themselves.28 
 
20 Id. at 12. 
21 Michael Price & Zach Simonetti, Defending Device Decryption Cases, 43 CHAMPION 
42, 42 (2019). 
22 Id. 
23 In re Martin-Trigona, 732 F.2d 170, 174 (2d Cir. 1984) (quoting Murphy v. 
Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 50 (1964)). 
24 Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 597 (1990). 
25 Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973). 
26 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
27 United States v. Authement, 607 F.2d 1129, 1131 (5th Cir. 1979) (interpreting Fisher 
v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976)). 
28 Couch, 409 U.S. at 327. 
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1. Establishing the Foregone Conclusion Doctrine – The 
Trilogy 
Fifth Amendment protections are not limited to speech. Accord-
ing to the Supreme Court, compelled actions can be considered tes-
timonial communications.29 In Fisher v. United States,30 the Court 
considered whether compelling an attorney to provide his client’s 
tax paperwork to the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) constituted 
compelled self-incrimination in conflict with his Fifth Amendment 
right.31 The right against producing one’s own incriminating papers 
is supported by longstanding jurisprudence.32 The preexisting docu-
ments are not protected, but the action of having to provide them 
against yourself is.33 However, the Fisher Court concluded that nei-
ther the attorney nor the client’s Fifth Amendment right allowed for 
denying an enforcement action by the IRS.34 The Court held that 
asserting the Fifth Amendment privilege is specific to barring the 
“use of ‘physical or moral compulsion’ exerted on the person.”35 
The Fifth Amendment only prevents incrimination by the defend-
ant’s own compelled testimonial communications.36 Here, the sub-
poenaed documents were prepared by the defendant’s accountant 
and therefore, did not constitute testimonial declarations against the 
defendant taxpayer—rather, it was merely a surrender.37 
The Fisher Court observed that the very act of production can 
be communicative by admitting possession, control, and the exist-
ence of the produced items.38 The key inquiry of the potentially 
communicative nature of compelled production concerns the con-
text of the production.39 To determine if compelled production be-
comes testimonial and therefore conflicts with the defendant’s Fifth 
 
29 See generally Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976). 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). 
33 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 407. 
34 Id. at 405, 414. 
35 Id. at 397 (quoting Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 15 (1918)) (emphasis added). 
36 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 410; see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 771 F.2d 143, 145 (6th Cir. 1985). 
39 See United States v. Schlansky, 709 F.2d 1079, 1083 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 
U.S. 1099 (1984). 
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Amendment right, it is pertinent to determine whether producing the 
evidence signifies a link in the evidentiary chain by providing the 
government with information they did not previously have.40 
There are certain long-standing exceptions that are exempt from 
the Fifth Amendment’s protection, such as: having blood drawn for 
a blood-alcohol test;41 being compelled to provide voice and hand-
writing samples;42 and being compelled to try on clothing or appear 
in front of the jury.43 Additionally, the required records exception44 
and the corporate records exception45 also remove compliance with 
a governmental demand for documents outside the protections of the 
Fifth Amendment. 
Two Supreme Court cases furthered Fisher’s doctrine of the 
communicative nature of producing documents. In the first case, 
United States v. Hubbell, the Court utilized Fisher’s “foregone con-
clusion” doctrine.46 This doctrine applies when the witness’ produc-
tion of the documents provided evidence that the government al-
ready had knowledge of, thus, the witness does not provide any ad-
ditional information to the government.47 When the existence, loca-
tion, and authenticity of the property in question is already a fore-
gone conclusion, the Fifth Amendment does not apply because it is 
a matter of surrender rather than testimony.48 The Hubbell Court 
found that the government cannot pursue charges against an individ-
ual who produced documents after receiving immunity because 
without this production the government had no other source or 
 
40 See, e.g., id. at 1084. 
41 E.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 762 (1966). 
42 E.g., Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266–67 (1967). 
43 E.g., Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252–53 (1910). 
44 E.g., United States v. Doe (In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated September 9, 2011), 
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156979, at *19–20 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2011) (discussing the 
required records exception, which is triggered when an individual engages in an activity 
that has a mandatory record-keeping requirement which obligates the individual to have 
these records). 
45 E.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum dated June 13, 1983 & June 22, 722 
F.2d 981, 986–88 (2d Cir. 1983) (discussing the corporate records exception, which 
compels officers of a corporation to provide the corporation’s records if subpoenaed by the 
government). 
46 United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 44–45 (2000). 
47 Doe v. United States (In re Grand Jury Subpoena), 383 F.3d 905, 910 (9th Cir. 2004). 
48 See id.  
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knowledge of the existence and location of these documents.49 To 
sustain such an indictment subsequent to a grant of immunity for the 
production of these documents, the government would have to show 
a “wholly independent” source from which it obtained the same ev-
idence.50 
In the second case, Doe v. United States, the Court notes that the 
Fifth Amendment protects the contents of an individual’s mind from 
compelled disclosure.51 This case involved the government’s inter-
est in gaining information about the defendant’s offshore bank ac-
counts.52 To obtain this information, the bank required the govern-
ment to provide a consent form signed by the defendant.53 The de-
fendant asserted that compelling his signature on a consent form 
would be a violation of his Fifth Amendment right.54 In a famous 
footnote responding to an argument from the dissenting Justice Ste-
vens, the majority contrasts the particular type of consent directive 
the defendant is being compelled to sign with being compelled to 
provide the “combination to [a] wall safe.”55 Subsequently, in Hub-
bell, this statement made its way into the text of the majority opinion 
which Justice Stevens authored.56 
2. What is “Foregone” in the Foregone Conclusion Doctrine? 
To address the changing Fifth Amendment inquiries, courts have 
utilized the language in Hubbell to develop elements to the foregone 
conclusion test.57 This test requires the government to have prior 
knowledge of the “location, existence, and authentic[ity]” of the 
 
49 See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 44–45. 
50 Id. at 45 (quoting Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460 (1972)). 
51 Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210–11 (1988). 
52 Id at 202–03. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 204. 
55 Id. at 210 n.9 (“In our view, such compulsion is more like ‘be[ing] forced to surrender 
a key to a strongbox containing incriminating documents’ than it is like ‘be[ing] compelled 
to reveal the combination to [petitioner’s] wall safe.’”). 
56 United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 43 (2000). 
57 See Jesse Coulon, Privacy, Screened Out: Analyzing the Threat to Individual Privacy 
Rights and Fifth Amendment Protections in State v. Stahl, 59 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. 225, 
234 (2018). 
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evidence it seeks.58 These three elements act as barriers against gov-
ernmental compulsion of evidence from an individual. If the gov-
ernment can show sufficient prior knowledge of the evidence’s lo-
cation and existence, and can independently prove its authenticity, 
then compelling the defendant to produce this evidence is not self-
incriminating and, therefore, permissible under the Fifth Amend-
ment since the government already knew about it.59 
The standard for the government’s showing of prior knowledge 
to establish the foregone conclusion is the “reasonable particularity” 
standard. The language of this standard originates from a Second 
Circuit case which the Hubbell Court utilized to demonstrate that 
the government was unable to establish knowledge of what docu-
ments they sought from Hubbell.60 When the case was granted cer-
tiorari, the Supreme Court agreed with the D.C. Circuit’s conclusion 
that the government failed its burden of showing adequate prior 
knowledge based on their overbroad request.61 Therefore, it would 
violate Hubbell’s Fifth Amendment right to be compelled to provide 
documents to the government because he would essentially be doing 
the work of incriminating himself for them.62 
3. It’s Complicated: Differing Opinions 
Applying the foregone conclusion doctrine can be complicated. 
Currently, there is no binding precedent on how to apply its so-
called elements, and the reasonable particularity standard is largely 
undefined. This has led courts to examine the issue from a variety 
of angles, attempting to balance the needs of the government with 
the Fifth Amendment rights of the accused. Below is an attempt to 
 
58 See id. at n.50; Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 32 (“The question the District Court should have 
addressed was the extent of the Government’s independent knowledge of the documents’ 
existence and authenticity, and of respondent’s possession or control of them.”). 
59 Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 44–45.  
60 United States v. Hubbell, 167 F.3d 552, 579 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“[W]e agree with the 
Second Circuit that the government must establish its knowledge of the existence, 
possession, and authenticity of subpoenaed documents with ‘reasonable particularity’ 
before the communication inherent in the act of production can be considered a foregone 
conclusion.”). 
61 Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 29–30, 44–45. 
62 Id. at 45. 
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summarize some of the current arguments in Fifth Amendment ju-
risprudence for compelling decryption of a digital device. 
a) Possession: Whose Phone Is It Anyway? 
Every detail must be considered when analyzing actions for their 
testimonial nature. The Florida Fourth District Court of Appeals has 
held that compelled decryption is not a foregone conclusion because 
decryption acts as a communication.63 In a case where the govern-
ment was seeking the decryption of a phone retrieved from a house-
hold with several individuals, the District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois, Eastern Division noted that being able to open 
the phone communicated possession and control over the device.64 
Therefore, compelling individuals to use their fingerprint to try to 
open a phone “tacitly concedes” ownership, unless the government 
can show prior knowledge of whose phone it is.65 If, once opened, 
the device contains evidence of the owner’s illegal activity, then 
opening the phone incriminates the opener and is, therefore, testi-
monial. 
b) What Is a Password? 
Typically, the password itself is not direct evidence. Analogiz-
ing the text of the Hubbell decision that “compelled testimony that 
communicates information that may ‘lead to incriminating evi-
dence’ is privileged even if the information itself is not inculpa-
tory,”66 the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, 
Southern Division held that requesting a password is not seeking 
evidence, but rather seeking a fact that leads to the evidence.67 
 
63 See G.A.Q.L. v. State, 257 So. 3d 1058, 1061–62 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018). 
64 See In re Single-Family Home & Attached Garage, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170184, 
at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 21, 2017), rev’d on other grounds, In re Search Warrant Application, 
279 F. Supp. 3d 800 (N.D. Ill. 2017); accord In re Search of a Residence in Oakland, 354 
F. Supp. 3d 1010, 1016 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (stating that “a successful finger or thumb scan 
confirms ownership or control of the device.”). 
65 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976) (explaining that compliance with a 
subpoena “tacitly concedes” the existence of the evidence sought). 
66 United States v. Kirschner, 823 F. Supp. 2d 665, 669 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (quoting Doe 
v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 208 n.6 (1988)). 
67 See id. 
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Therefore, providing a password can be a testimonial communica-
tion because it leads to other evidence.68 
Courts often characterize a password as knowledge, thereby 
making it “contents of the mind.”69 This characterization prevents 
passwords from being a foregone conclusion and are, therefore, tes-
timonial. In another case, Pollard v. State, the court notes that the 
method of providing the password, whether defendant enters it into 
the phone, writes it down, or says it, does not negate that it is a prod-
uct of the defendant’s mind.70 
c) Types of Encryption 
Some courts distinguish between passwords and biometric de-
cryption.71 These courts assert that using a fingerprint to decrypt a 
digital device is merely a physical act and therefore is as good as a 
foregone conclusion.72 In contrast, since the government does not 
know the password, decryption via password is not a forgone con-
clusion.73 
In Minnesota, the Diamond court argued that the physical act of 
providing a fingerprint is no different than other longstanding man-
ners of compelling the suspect to perform a physical act to confirm 
or deny his guilt.74 As previously mentioned, there are established 
exceptions to the Fifth Amendment, such as allowing for blood 
draws or making a court appearance to be identified by the victim.75 
The court found that unlocking a phone via fingerprint is no more 
testimonial than these longstanding physical exceptions.76 
 
68 See id. 
69 See, e.g., id (quoting Doe, 487 U.S. at 211); Commonwealth v. Baust, 89 Va. Cir. 267, 
271 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2014). 
70 Pollard v. State, 287 So. 3d 639, 653 (Fla. 2019), denied motion for rehearing and 
certified questions to 2019 Fla. App. LEXIS 18978 (Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2019). 
71 See Baust, 89 Va. Cir. at 271; but see In re Search of a Residence in Oakland, 354 F. 
Supp. 3d 1010, 1016 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
72 See, e.g., United States v. Barrera, 415 F. Supp. 3d 832, 839 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 22, 2019). 
73 Baust, 89 Va. Cir. at 271. 
74 See State v. Diamond, 890 N.W.2d 143, 151 (Ct. App. Minn. 2017). 
75 See supra Section I.B.1. 
76 Id. 
2021] ABRIDGING THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 1167 
 
d) Waiver: Once Revealed, It Is No Longer a Secret  
In Vermont, the Boucher court found that if an individual has 
already shown files to the government, thereby confirming the ex-
istence, location, and authenticity of these files, the Fifth Amend-
ment protection is waived.77 The government’s knowledge of files 
that the defendant has already confirmed makes them foregone.78 
Boucher complied with a preliminary search of his computer, which 
contained child pornography, but later refused to provide the pass-
word.79 Since the existence of these files on his computer was al-
ready a foregone conclusion, providing the password no longer car-
ried any testimonial value.80 This voluntary production as waiver 
has been held to be true even in a case where the defendant was in 
custody and had not been given her Miranda rights.81 
e) Rejected Distinctions 
i. Voluntarily Created Files Can Still Be Testimonial 
In an Eleventh Circuit case, the defendant rebutted the govern-
ment’s argument that files created voluntarily are not testimonial be-
cause they were not created to be incriminating.82 The Court held 
that the government’s argument missed the issue of whether the act 
of production, not the contents, was communicative.83 Here, the 
court required the government to show that it had knowledge of 
 
77 In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Boucher), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13006, at *9–10 (D. 
Vt. Feb. 19, 2009). 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 9. 
80 Id. at 9–10; Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt, 468 Mass. 512, 524 (2014) (finding that the 
defendant’s post-arrest interview informed the government that his transactions and 
communications utilized his computers and affirmed his ownership of the computers, 
thereby making any communication from decrypting them a foregone conclusion). 
81 United States v. Oloyede, 933 F.3d 302, 309 (4th Cir. 2019); but see United States v. 
Green, 272 F.3d 748, 753 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding that once an individual has invoked his 
right to counsel, any subsequent interrogation results in testimonial and inadmissible self-
incrimination). 
82 United States v. Doe (In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum), 670 F.3d 1335, 1342 
(11th Cir. 2012). 
83 Id. 
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some of the contents of the device rather than merely knowing that 
the defendant can decrypt it.84 
ii. Decryption Is Not Assembly 
Another rejected distinction is that decryption actually forces the 
defendant to assemble the data together for the government.85 Un-
like when Hubbell was required to collect thousands of documents, 
biometric decryption cannot be considered testimonial by claiming 
it is an act of assembly since this process is accomplished by a single 
tap of defendant’s finger.86 The U.S. District Court for the District 
of Columbia found that the difference in cognitive exertion involved 
in the assembly process distinguished whether it was testimonial.87 
f) Effort Involved May Make a Difference 
Similarly to above, the Eleventh Circuit held that a defendant 
was not required to produce an unencrypted hard drive.88 The court 
found that it was testimonial that rather than seeking decryption of 
a device, the government sought to require the defendant to produce 
a copy of the unencrypted hard drive.89 A later court noted that pro-
ducing an unencrypted hard drive is more cognitively demanding 
than the act of biometrically decrypting a device, thereby causing 
production of an unencrypted hard drive to not be a foregone con-
clusion.90 
g) Scope of Reasonable Particularity 
The Hubbell Court considered the government’s request for 
“any and all” documents to be an indication that the government did 
not have enough knowledge of the defendant’s incriminatory pos-
sessions to rise to the level of a foregone conclusion.91 Knowing that 
an individual keeps business records is insufficient for showing with 
 
84 United States v. Spencer, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70649, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 
2018) (interpreting Doe (In re Grand Jury Subpoena), 670 F.3d at 1347). 
85 In re Search of [Redacted], 317 F. Supp. 3d 523, 537–38 (D.D.C. 2018). 
86 Id. at 538. 
87 Id. 
88 See generally Doe (In re Grand Jury Subpoena), 670 F.3d. 
89 Id. at 1346. 
90 State v. Diamond, 890 N.W.2d 143, 150 (Ct. App. Minn. 2017). 
91 United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 38 (2000). 
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reasonable particularity that he has the documents the government 
is seeking.92 Such an overbroad statement cannot be the basis for a 
foregone conclusion because answering such a request would show 
that the defendant believed the documents he produced were actu-
ally what the government sought. Compliance with such a request 
implicitly communicates the defendant’s belief that these docu-
ments reveal their guilt and waive the defendant’s option to deny 
knowledge of what the government is seeking. 
Other courts have determined that the government’s lack of 
specificity for the files it seeks is actually a Fourth Amendment is-
sue,93 while simultaneously noting that “it is nonsensical to ask 
whether the government has established with ‘reasonable particular-
ity’ that the defendant is able to decrypt a device.”94 The Spencer 
court noted that the reasonable particularity standard is ill-suited for 
the yes or no inquiry of whether the defendant can open his phone; 
rather, such a standard is more logically tailored to determining if 
the government has shown enough prior knowledge to meet its bur-
den of showing the device’s contents are a foregone conclusion not 
worthy of the Fifth Amendment’s protection.95 
 
II. A CRY FOR HELP: WHEN DOCTRINE IS MISCONSTRUED 
A. Dangerous Interpretations: State v. Stahl 
In 2014, the Floridian police arrested Aaron Stahl on charges of 
video voyeurism for attempting to capture video footage up a 
woman’s skirt with his cell phone.96 When police located and ar-
rested him, he did not have his cell phone on him.97 Once arrested, 
he agreed to have his phone searched but then withdrew his con-
sent.98 He had already identified the phone—an iPhone 5—and 
 
92 Doe v. United States (In re Grand Jury Subpoena), 383 F.3d 905, 911–12 (9th Cir. 
2004). 
93 United States v. Spencer, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70649, at *7–8 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 
2018). 
94 Id. at 8. 
95 Id. at 9. 
96 State v. Stahl, 206 So. 3d 124, 127 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016). 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 128. 
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confirmed that it could be found at his residence.99 However, when 
police discovered the phone was password protected,100 the Fifth 
Amendment analysis began, and it went awry.  
The Stahl court focused on the testimonial element of the Fifth 
Amendment right.101 It found that the production of a password does 
not constitute a testimonial communication and therefore, the state 
can compel decryption of a password encrypted device.102 Stahl 
classifies biometrics as mere physical acts to classify biometric de-
cryption as nontestimonial.103 Such reasoning fails to recognize that 
mere physical acts serve to utilize the defendant’s physical qualities 
as evidence, rather than having the defendant supply access to evi-
dence.  
The Stahl court asserts two lines of reasoning which decrease 
the burden of the foregone conclusion doctrine. First, Stahl reduced 
the government’s burden to showing independent knowledge of the 
existence, authenticity, and possession of the phone’s password, ra-
ther than having to show independent knowledge of the evidence 
that is encrypted on the phone.104 Second, the court found that if the 
foregone conclusion doctrine applies to passwords, the passwords 
must be considered self-authenticating, thereby both removing au-
thentication as an element of the doctrine and simultaneously caus-
ing the defendant’s act of decryption to be communicative of the 
authenticity of the content on the device.105 The Stahl court also 
struggled to determine how a password is actually defined within its 
abridged version of the doctrine. At different points in the opinion, 
the court regarded passwords as a source of evidence,106 but subse-
quently considered the password to be the evidence that must be 
foregone for the government to compel decryption.107 Each of these 




101 Id. at 132. 
102 Id. at 134. 
103 Id. at 135. 
104 Id. at 136. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 134. 
107 Id. at 135–36. 
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1. Passwords as Nontestimonial Communications 
The Stahl court found that producing a password was a nontes-
timonial communication.108 The Fifth Amendment privilege only 
protects against compulsion of testimonial communications, while 
nontestimonial materials can be compelled.109 Therefore, the testi-
monial status of a password determines whether the Fifth Amend-
ment protects encrypted devices. 
Many courts find that something is testimonial if it utilizes the 
contents of the individual’s mind.110 But the Stahl court noted that 
the Hubbell Court spoke of “extensive” use of the contents of the 
mind.111 This led Stahl to assert that the content being sought must 
be of “testimonial significance” to be testimonial.112 Therefore, the 
Stahl court concluded that because the password being sought does 
not alone have testimonial significance, it is a nontestimonial com-
munication.113 This reasoning prevented Stahl from asserting his 
Fifth Amendment right, and allowed the government to compel the 
unlocking of his iPhone. 
The issue with Stahl’s analysis is that it misses the Hubbell 
Court’s point of juxtaposing the notion of the “extensive” use of the 
contents of the mind with a reiteration of Doe’s famous footnote, 
showing that physical keys are different than keys stored in one’s 
memory.114 This juxtaposition served to show that extensive usage 
of one’s cognitive abilities to collect hundreds of documents is more 
similar to being compelled to provide a wall safe combination than 
the non-cognitively demanding act of handing over a physical key 
to open a box.115 It is a typical and commonplace convention of 
speech to follow a conceptual statement with an example to help 
 
108 Id. at 134. 
109 Id. at 131. 
110 Id. at 133–34. 
111 Id. (quoting United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 43 (2000)). 
112 Id. at 133–34 (quoting Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 211 n.10 (1988)).  
113 Id. at 133–35. 
114 Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 43 (“It was unquestionably necessary for respondent to make 
extensive use of ‘the contents of his own mind’ in identifying the hundreds of documents 
responsive to the requests in the subpoena….The assembly of those documents was like 
telling an inquisitor the combination to a wall safe, not like being forced to surrender the 
key to a strongbox.”). 
115 Id. 
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visualize the content of the preceding sentence. By using Hubbell’s 
“extensive usage of the mind” out of context of the subsequent state-
ment, the Stahl court misapplied Hubbell’s case language. Severing 
“extensive” from the wall safe combination example attempts to 
make producing a password into an insignificant, and thus, nontes-
timonial communication. At the extreme, this mistaken interpreta-
tion permits compelled decryption to be subject to governmental 
compulsion like any other type of physical evidence—despite a 
password’s existence as contents of the mind. 
2. To Be the Evidence or to Provide the Evidence 
The Stahl court confuses two important ideas: (1) the defend-
ant’s characteristics being classified as the evidence and (2) the gov-
ernment utilizing the defendant’s physical characteristics as a vehi-
cle to obtaining other evidence.116 In coming to the conclusion that 
passwords are nontestimonial, the Stahl court asserts that it is nec-
essary to prevent biometrically encrypted cell phones from receiv-
ing less protection under the Fifth Amendment than passwords.117 
The court then sought to ensure that neither format of encryption 
received Fifth Amendment protection. Their argument hinges on 
their assumption that biometric decryption does not convey more 
than an unprotected mere physical act.118 
Under longstanding Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, an accused 
may be forced to do certain physical acts to confirm or deny their 
guilt, such as providing blood samples or voice exemplars.119 If 
these compelled acts were not permitted under the Fifth Amend-
ment, Justice Holmes noted, a court would not even be allowed to 
bring the defendant in to be viewed by a jury.120 However, conflat-
ing the physical acts permitted by Fifth Amendment jurispru-
dence—of being the physical evidence against oneself with 
 
116 Stahl, 206 So. 3d at 135; but see Doe, 487 U.S. at 211 n.10 (utilizing the phrase 
“testimonial significance” to explain the distinction between serving as the physical 
evidence and physically complying with a compulsion order to provide a source of 
evidence). 
117 Stahl, 206 So. 3d at 135. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763 (1966). 
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biometric decryption—misunderstands the goal of using the defend-
ant as evidence against oneself when there would be no other alter-
native. 
Forcing the defendant to unlock a phone is not about being the 
evidence, it is about directly supplying the evidence. This additional 
step between being the evidence and personally supplying the evi-
dence, regardless of the format of decryption, results in a testimonial 
action “furnish[ing] a link in the chain of evidence.”121 Unless the 
ownership and content on the device has already been shown to be 
a foregone conclusion through independent means, compelled bio-
metric decryption communicates the defendant’s relationship with 
the device and its contents. 
In Doe, the government carefully crafted the consent directive 
to avoid being testimonial; the directive did not assert any facts by 
requesting information on any accounts Doe “may” be associated 
with, without specifying from which bank, and by adding the addi-
tional layer of protection of requiring independent authentication.122 
The Doe defendant was not revealing possession with this signature; 
rather the signature served to allow the government to obtain access 
to documents from a third-party that may result in relevant evidence, 
which the government would subsequently have to authenticate in-
dependently.123 This distinguishes Doe’s physical act of signing the 
directive from the direct and personal surrender of evidence pro-
vided by biometric decryption, which communicates that the evi-
dence on the device was placed there by the individual with match-
ing physical features.124  
It is important to note that the above analysis is not applicable if 
the government already knew the phone contained illicit content and 
had probable cause to believe the suspect had committed the crime. 
 
121 United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 38 (2000) (quoting Hoffman v. United States, 
341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951)) (“‘The privilege afforded not only extends to answers that would 
in themselves support a conviction…but likewise embraces those which would furnish a 
link in the chain of evidence.’”). 
122 Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 215 (1988). 
123 Id. 
124 Aric Jenkins, Could an ‘Evil Twin’ Trick Your iPhone’s Facial Recognition?, TIME 
(Sept. 13, 2017), https://time.com/4940176/apple-iphone-x-face-id-facial-recognition/ 
[https://perma.cc/Q89G-5MDH]. 
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If biometric decryption served to merely confirm ownership over the 
device, then compelled biometric decryption would be the same as 
being classified as physical evidence against oneself. 
3. Reducing the Foregone Conclusion Burden 
The Stahl court diminished the foregone conclusion doctrine to 
only require the government to prove with reasonable particularity 
that a password exists, the password is within the defendant’s con-
trol, and it is authentic.125 Stahl’s focus is on the vessel, the device 
holding the evidence, but the Fifth Amendment’s protection is for 
protecting the defendant from having to produce their own self-in-
criminating evidence. The foregone conclusion was established for 
the limited circumstances in which the government can inde-
pendently show it already knew of the evidence in the defendant’s 
possession,126 not that the defendant has access to a source of poten-
tial evidence. 
The Stahl court accomplished this outrageous misreading of the 
foregone conclusion doctrine by misunderstanding the circum-
stances in Boucher,127 where the defendant voluntarily allowed the 
government to search and discover child pornography on his com-
puter and, therefore, made his possession of illicit content a foregone 
conclusion.128 The government’s previous search of the contents of 
the computer acts as independent knowledge of the device’s content, 
making the illicit content a foregone conclusion and nullifying the 
testimonial nature of providing the password to the computer. 
Boucher is easily distinguishable from Stahl, where the govern-
ment was attempting to access Stahl’s phone to try and prove he in 
fact committed a crime.129 Knowing Boucher’s encrypted computer 
contains child pornography is different than knowing that Stahl’s 
phone is password encrypted. The officers investigating Stahl did 
not have any independent means for knowing the contents of his 
phone and wanted access to its decrypted files to obtain the initial 
 
125 State v. Stahl, 206 So. 3d 124, 136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016). 
126 Doe v. United States (In re Grand Jury Subpoena), 383 F.3d 905, 910 (9th Cir. 2004). 
127 Stahl, 206 So. 3d at 136. 
128 In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Boucher), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13006, at *9 (D. Vt. 
Feb. 19, 2009). 
129 Compare Boucher, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13006, at *9, with Stahl, 206 So. 3d at 127. 
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evidence.130 By only requiring proof that Stahl has the password to 
his own phone, the Stahl court drastically reduced the government’s 
burden envisioned by the Hubbell Court for the foregone conclusion 
doctrine.131 
Comparing Stahl to Hubbell, the Hubbell Court held that the 
government’s overbroad demand for thousands of documents 
showed that the government had not met its burden for the foregone 
conclusion exception to the production of self-incriminating evi-
dence.132 A sweeping compulsion of business records, without any 
specificity, evidences that the government failed to independently 
identify what they were seeking from Hubbell. 
The government did not want Stahl’s password for the sake of 
knowing the password; the password served as a vehicle to a poten-
tial avenue for evidence. When the Stahl court held that if the gov-
ernment can prove that the defendant has the password to his phone 
then the password is a foregone conclusion, this is the equivalent of 
saying that if the government knew Hubbell owned papers then all 
of his papers were a foregone conclusion to be freely collected by 
the government. The Supreme Court held the opposite by invalidat-
ing a claim for the foregone conclusion doctrine because the over-
broad demand signified the government’s inability to articulate 
which documents they wanted.133 
4. Removing Elements of the Foregone Conclusion Doctrine 
The Stahl decision removes the authenticity element from the 
foregone conclusion doctrine by determining that passcodes are self-
authenticating.134 According to Stahl, if the government, with 
 
130 See generally Stahl, 206 So. 3d at 127. 
131 United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 45; Stahl, 206 So. 3d at 135 (contradicting 
itself, having stated the correct burden of proof at the beginning of the opinion: “However, 
even the testimonial communication implicit in the act of production does not rise ‘to the 
level of testimony within the protection of the Fifth Amendment’ where the State has 
established, through independent means, the existence, possession, and authenticity of the 
documents.”). 
132 Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 45. 
133 Id. (“The Government cannot cure this deficiency through the overbroad argument 
that a businessman such as respondent will always possess general business and tax records 
that fall within the broad categories described in this subpoena.”). 
134 Stahl, 206 So. 3d at 136. 
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reasonable particularity, determines a device belongs to the defend-
ant and a password exists that the defendant can unlock the device 
with, then the contents of the device are authentic. This reduces the 
government’s burden for the foregone conclusion exception to the 
Fifth Amendment; it only needs to prove the existence and location 
elements. 
Additionally, determining a password’s authenticity based on 
whether or not it opens the device is backwards;135 such a process 
forces the defendant to authenticate the password him/herself by 
showing the password opens the device.136 Not only does this self-
authenticating test137 appear to remove an element of the foregone 
conclusion doctrine, but it actually makes the action of entering the 
password retroactively communicative (of its own authenticity), and 
therefore testimonial, as it provides the government with infor-
mation they did not know before (that the password is authentic).138 
Furthermore, authenticity is a distinct rule of the admissibility of 
evidence and acts as a potential defense for criminal defendants that 
should not be eradicated.139   
5. Inconsistent Usage of Passwords as Two Separate Things 
Finally, the Stahl court simultaneously considered a password to 
be two opposing concepts. Earlier in the decision, the password is 
merely a means to evidence and therefore, it is non-testimonial be-
cause it is insignificant.140 Later in the decision, the court argues un-
der the assumption that the password is evidence.141 For the 
 
135 Id. (“If the phone or computer is accessible once the passcode or key has been entered, 
the passcode or key is authentic.”). 
136 Pollard v. State, 287 So. 3d 649, 656 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019); People v. Spicer, 125 
N.E.3d 1286, 1292 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019). 
137 Stahl, 206 So. 3d at 136. 
138 Spicer, 125 N.E.3d at 1292. 
139 FED. R. EVID. 901 & 902; FLA. STAT § 90.901 (2012). 
140 Stahl, 206 So. 3d at 134 (“[A]lthough the passcode would allow the State access to 
the phone, and therefore to a source of potential evidence, the State has a warrant to search 
the phone—the source of evidence had already been uncovered.”). 
141 Id. at 135–36 (“That is, by implicitly admitting the existence of the evidence requested 
and that it is in the accused’s possession the accused ‘adds little or nothing to the sum total 
of the Government’s information’” and “[t]o know whether providing the passcode implies 
testimony that is a foregone conclusion, the relevant question is whether the State has 
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purposes of the foregone conclusion, it is essential that the court re-
solve this inconsistency by acknowledging that a password is rarely 
itself evidence, but rather a method of access to evidence. 
The Stahl court risks the integrity of the foregone conclusion 
doctrine and the protections of the Fifth Amendment with its erro-
neous reasoning and findings. Providing a password is a testimonial 
communication as it utilizes contents of the mind to decrypt a digital 
device and is not a mere surrender. Biometric decryption is not the 
same as physical acts of being the evidence against one’s self. To 
utilize the foregone conclusion doctrine, the government must carry 
its burden of independent knowledge of the data it seeks from the 
device it wants decrypted. The defendant’s successful decryption of 
a device cannot retroactively authenticate the content of the device. 
Ultimately, passwords are not evidence themselves, but rather they 
are a link to a source of evidence. 
B. Stahl’s Progeny 
1. When Stahl’s Holding Traveled Beyond the Floridian 
Borders 
While some courts are not convinced by Stahl’s abridged ver-
sion of the foregone conclusion doctrine,142 other courts are employ-
ing it.143 The Stahl holding and its reasoning has permeated Fifth 
Amendment jurisprudence in several states. 
In State v. Andrews, the New Jersey court used Stahl’s abridged 
foregone conclusion doctrine as support for its statements that 
 
established that it knows with reasonable particularity that the passcode exists, is within 
the accused’s possession or control, and is authentic.”). 
142 G.A.Q.L. v. State, 257 So. 3d 1058, 1063 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018) (disagreeing with 
its sister court of appeals that the foregone conclusion is strictly for getting the contents of 
the phone, not the password); Pollard v. State, 287 So. 3d 649, 651 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
June 20, 2019), review dismissed and motion denied as moot by No. SC20-110, 2020 Fla. 
LEXIS 522, at *1 (Mar. 25, 2020) (noting that the government has to carry its burden for 
the foregone conclusion exception before it unlocks the phone, which means authenticity 
cannot be proven afterwards by showing the phone opens when defendant puts his 
password in); Seo v. State, 148 N.E.3d 952, 970 (Ind. 2020). 
143 State v. Andrews, 457 N.J. Super. 14, 27 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 2018); State v. 
Johnson, 576 S.W.3d 205, 226 (Mo. Ct. App. 2019); State v. Pittman, 300 Or. App. 147, 
161–62 (2019); Commonwealth v. Jones, 481 Mass. 540, 548 (2019). 
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providing a password does not constitute a testimonial communica-
tion because the government already knows the password exists and 
the government only needs to show that the defendant has the pass-
word to his device.144 On appeal to New Jersey’s Supreme Court, 
Andrews once again leaned on Stahl’s reasoning for support145 citing 
Stahl for two components of its abridged approach to the foregone 
conclusion doctrine: 1) the government’s knowledge with reasona-
ble particularity of the existence and defendant’s possession of the 
password, as opposed to focusing on the evidence sought from the 
device;146 and 2) Stahl’s declaration that, for digital devices, the au-
thenticity prong of the foregone conclusion doctrine should be as-
sumed.147 
Aside from fostering other New Jersey cases,148 Andrews’ hold-
ing has since been used as support in a Missouri case,149 and is men-
tioned in an Ohio case,150 spreading the influence of Stahl’s holding 
further. Oregon takes it a step further, drastically abridging the Fifth 
Amendment by disregarding the elements of the foregone conclu-
sion doctrine altogether.151 
2. Scary New Trends as Stahl’s Reasoning Continues to 
Spread 
The scary reality of Stahl’s holding is exacerbated when subse-
quent courts loosen the doctrine even further. In State v. Pittman, 
the defendant appealed a contempt order from her refusal to provide 
her phone password in relation to an investigation of defendant’s 
 
144 Andrews, 457 N.J. Super. at 27, 29. 
145 State v. Andrews, 243 N.J. 447, 475–76 (2020). 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 481. 
148 In re State’s Application, No. A-4509-18T2, 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1708, 
at *8 (Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 11, 2020) (applying Andrews’ foregone conclusion 
doctrine by showing that Max owned the phone, the phone was password protected because 
the state could not open it, and the password self-authenticates); State v. Anthony, No. A-
0714-19T4, 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1737, at *1–2 (Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 18, 
2020). 
149 State v. Johnson, 576 S.W.3d 205, 227–28 (Mo. Ct. App. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. 
Ct. 472, 205 L. Ed. 2d 286, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 6651 (U.S. 2019). 
150 In re M.W., 2018-Ohio-5227, ¶¶ 60–63 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018). 
151 State v. Pittman, 300 Or. App. 147, 149 (2019), rev’d and remanded on different 
grounds by State v. Pittman, 376 Ore. 498 (2021). 
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involvement in a single-vehicle accident with a tree.152 The govern-
ment sought to compel the defendant to open her phone to acquire 
evidence that the defendant was under the influence of an illicit sub-
stance when she was involved in the accident.153 Pittman was held 
in contempt of court for entering her password wrong twice.154 
Pittman utilized Stahl’s holding that passwords are nontestimo-
nial to abandon the foregone conclusion doctrine when compelling 
decryption of a device that the government had already lawfully 
seized by warrant.155 The court stated that the government’s posses-
sion of the device is the equivalent of the government’s possession 
of the data on the device, despite its encrypted format.156 Neither the 
Court of Appeals of Oregon,157 nor the Supreme Court of Oregon158 
attempts to employ the elements of the foregone conclusion doc-
trine. 
Further, the Supreme Court of Oregon established precedent that 
the State can waive the testimonial aspects of decrypting a device 
without first requiring the State to show prior knowledge of the con-
tents of the device.159 The court accomplished this by allowing the 
state to “not use defendant’s act of unlocking the phone as evidence; 
[the State] would only use it to gain access to the phone.”160 This is 
contrary to Fisher’s finding that the existence of, and access to, ev-
idence is testimonial in and of itself.161 According to  Pittman the 
“testimonial aspects of the act have constitutional significance, 
 
152 Pittman, 300 Or. App. at 149. 
153 Id. at 150. 
154 Id. at 151–52. 
155 Id. at 161 (“The state did not need to establish, however, that the contents of the 
iPhone were a foregone conclusion.”). 
156 Id. 
157 See generally Pittman, 300 Or. App. 
158 See generally State v. Pittman, 376 Or. 498 (2021). 
159 Id. at 523–26 (“[T]he state informed the court that it would not use defendant’s act of 
unlocking the phone as evidence; it would use it only to gain access to the phone…[we] 
permit an order compelling a defendant to unlock a cell phone so long as the state…is 
prohibited from using defendant’s act against defendant, except to obtain access to the 
contents of the phone.”). 
160 Id. at 523–24. 
161 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976) (“Surely the Government is in no 
way relying on the “truthtelling” of the taxpayer to prove the existence of or his access to 
the documents.”). 
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which we must address; the access that the act provides does not.”162 
This reasoning ignores the fact that if the government does not have 
prior knowledge of the existence of the evidence, then the evidence 
itself becomes testimonial by communicating its own existence.  
The existence of the evidence and the defendant’s access to it  
are communicative of a relationship between the evidence on the 
digital device and the defendant.163 The Fisher Court allowed the 
government to demand the production of the tax documents because 
the government already knew these documents existed in the pos-
session of a third-party, the defendants’ attorneys.164  Pittman cor-
rectly asserts that the evidence is not protected165 but the Pittman 
court is wrong to think the government can waive the testimonial 
nature of opening the device to provide evidence the government 
did not previously know of. Without prior governmental knowledge 
of the existence of the evidence, the evidence’s own existence is tes-
timonial as it speaks against its owner and communicates the de-
fendant’s access to it. Therefore, the existence of the evidence 
should be protected until the government can show knowledge that 
the evidence’s existence is a foregone conclusion. The existence, the 
access, the relationship between defendant and the evidence, etc.166 
are the communicative and testimonial aspects that the foregone 
conclusion element exists to protect. 
The Pittman case further demonstrates the delicate nature of for-
mulating exceptions to constitutional rights. Any concessions are 
likely to be further loosened over time, whether by the development 
of new circumstances or by misinterpretations in the applicability of 
the exception. And when the doctrine is loose enough, the courts 
may discard it altogether. For the viability of constitutional rights 
over time it is vital that exceptions to the rule be narrowly construed. 
The manner in which Stahl and its progeny flippantly turn over all 
 
162 Pittman, 376 Or. at 525. 
163 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410 (“The act of producing evidence in response to a subpoena 
nevertheless has communicative aspects of its own, wholly aside from the contents of the 
papers produced. Compliance with the subpoena tacitly concedes the existence of the 
papers demanded and their possession or control by the taxpayer.”). 
164 Id. at 411. 
165 Pittman, 376 Or. at 525. 
166 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410. 
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encrypted digital devices does injustice to the careful protections 
that have surrounded the Fifth Amendment for years.167 
The compulsion orders themselves are likely to lead to novel 
complications.168 If suspects claim that they do not know or cannot 
remember their passwords, courts will have to consider when to 
punish the individuals for defying a compulsion order.169 It would 
be a miscarriage of justice if individuals were held in contempt for 
genuinely not knowing a password. If the penalty for being held in 
contempt is less than the sentence for the crime the defendant is ac-
cused of, the defendant may engage in a cost-benefit analysis and 
strategically choose non-compliance.170 The government must then 
show that the defendant willfully refused to comply or else the de-
fendant may avoid any consequence for their noncompliance.171 
This could push courts and legislatures to escalate the penalty for 
being held in contempt. But it will be a struggle for the courts to 
determine whether the defendant was willfully noncompliant. The 
court sought to hold the Pittman defendant in contempt for provid-
ing the wrong password to the device and chose not to provide a 
written discussion of how it determined that Pittman was willful in 
her noncompliance.172 
Further, hasty application of exceptions to constitutional rights 
will subject criminal defendants to arbitrary differences in their 
rights. The distinction between biometrics and alphanumeric pass-
words is particularly inconspicuous to lay people who will not real-
ize that their legal rights change based on how they encrypt their 
devices. The recent court cases about compelled biometric 
 
167  See Commonwealth v. Jones, 481 Mass. 540, 547 (2019) (Lenk, J., concurring); see 
also Pollard v. State, 287 So. 3d 649, 653–54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019) (questioning Stahl’s 
reasoning for the sake of individual autonomy, concerns of governmental overreach, and 
the original understanding of the Fifth Amendment). 




172 State v. Pittman, 300 Or. App. 147, 152 (2019) (rejecting the defendant’s argument, 
without a written discussion, that the State did not show defendant’s entering of the wrong 
password was willful non-compliance). 
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decryption have been discussed by technology news outlets.173 It 
seems unfair to reward people under the law with their Fifth Amend-
ment right for having access to legal news, following technology-
related news, or for their preference on how to decrypt their device. 
Such a nuanced distinction is unfair. It creates inequitable results for 
criminal defendants that do not know that biometric decryption 
means their bodies can be used against them if the government wants 
access to their device. Many mobile phones,174 tablets,175 and some 
personal computers176 are equipped with biometric decryption tech-
nology. This problem will only get worse as newer formats of de-
cryption arise—leading to unpredictable results. 
3. Scholarly Considerations for Finding a Solution 
Scholars have offered their opinions on how to resolve the am-
biguities in the applicability of Fisher’s foregone conclusion doc-
trine to compelled decryption. There is some consensus that the gov-
ernment cannot compel the defendant to write down or orally pro-
vide their password to an encrypted device.177 Being compelled to 
provide the password orally or in written format would force a crim-
inal defendant to reveal the contents of his or her mind.178 Addition-
ally, the foregone conclusion doctrine is built upon the act of pro-
ducing something that was voluntarily created by the defendant 
 
173 See Lily Hay Newman, Why Cops Can Force You to Unlock Your Phone with Your 
Face, WIRED (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/police-unlock-iphone-face-id-
legal-rights/ [https://perma.cc/Q8XH-HAZB]. 
174 GLOBAL NEWSWIRE, Global Consumer Biometrics Market Research Report 2020-2025 
(Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2020/03/18/ 
2002724/0/en/global-consumer-biometrics-market-research-report-2020-2025.html 
[https://perma.cc/3TP6-UQLE] (“According to the Credit Suisse report, in 2018, the 
shipment of smartphones with fingerprint sensors worldwide stood at 1,082 million 
units.”). 
175 See Xiomara Bianco, Best Tablets with Fingerprint Sensors, CNET (Apr. 5, 2017), 
 https://www.cnet.com/news/best-tablets-with-fingerprint-sensors/ [https://perma.cc/9JZ7-
ZE6N].  
176 See David Nield, How to Log into Your Computer with Your Fingerprint or Face, 
POPULAR SCI. (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.popsci.com/computer-login-
fingerprint-face/ [https://perma.cc/96YA-6P7N].  
177 Laurent Sacharoff, What Am I Really Saying When I Open My Smartphone? A 
Response to Orin S. Kerr, 97 TEX. L. REV. ONLINE 63, 64 (2019) [hereinafter What Am I 
Really Saying]. 
178 Id. at 68. 
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prior to the government’s involvement, preexisting the compulsion, 
rather than writing something down in response to the compul-
sion.179 The question remains: can a court compel the criminal de-
fendant to enter the password into the device to decrypt it?180  
In such circumstances, the defendant does not reveal the password 
but decrypts the device and provides the decrypted device to the 
government to search.181 
First it must be determined what the act of decryption communi-
cates.182 While some scholars feel that decryption only reveals the 
defendant’s knowledge of the password, others argue that decryp-
tion potentially communicates the defendant’s dominion and own-
ership of the device and their knowing possession of the files on the 
device.183 This point of contention is at the center of the issue of 
applying the foregone conclusion doctrine.184 
Professor Laurent Sacharoff of the University of Arkansas 
School of Law points out that Doe would consider production to be 
testimonial for “implicit statements of fact.”185 This requires us to 
consider all the potential inferences that come from requiring a de-
fendant to decrypt his or her device, including knowledge, posses-
sion of the device and its files, and authenticity.186 According to Sa-
charoff, if decryption only reveals knowledge of the password, then 
for the decryption to be a foregone conclusion, the government need 
only show that the defendant knows the password.187 However, if 
decryption reveals ownership of the device or possession of the files, 
then the government must first reveal independent knowledge of the 
files it seeks from the device.188 Since the password is never 
 
179 Laurent Sacharoff, Unlocking the Fifth Amendment: Passwords and Encrypted 
Devices, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 203, 236 (2018) [hereinafter Unlocking the Fifth 
Amendment]. 
180 What Am I Really Saying, supra note 179, at 65. 
181 Id. at 68. 
182 Id. at 67. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. at 70 (quoting Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 209 (1988)).  
186 Id. at 70–71. 
187 Id. at 67. 
188 Id. 
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produced and provided to the government because it is contents of 
the mind, the password itself cannot be the thing that is foregone.189 
Some scholars feel the Fifth Amendment analysis here is alto-
gether misplaced. If not, Professor Orin Kerr argues, then the Fifth 
Amendment protections provide an elevated protection, in compar-
ison to Fourth Amendment protections, to defendants who encrypt 
their devices.190 Kerr notes that once law enforcement obtains a war-
rant to search a house, they can search the house and the same should 
be true of digital devices.191 Kerr advocates for a bright line rule that 
if the government can show that the defendant knows the password 
to the decrypted device and that they have the device and a court 
order, the defendant should not be able to assert a Fifth Amendment 
privilege.192 This will prevent criminal defendants from hindering 
the effects of a search warrant by hiding behind a password.193 Kerr 
feels that encryption technology is not an appropriate place for Fifth 
Amendment rules to apply because these rules will act as barriers on 
top of the Fourth Amendment protections already in place.194 
Some scholars take a different approach: rather than pitting the 
value of one amendment against the other, we need to consider com-
pelled decryption of a device seized by a warrant as a hybrid Fourth 
and Fifth Amendment question requiring its own unique analysis.195 
This approach would only allow the state to retrieve the specific files 
that they can describe with reasonable particularity prior to the de-
fendant’s compelled decryption.196 
Some scholars are starting to take the view that perhaps such a 
flippant disregard for biometric encryption misses some important 
considerations.197 The act of biometric decryption communicates the 
 
189 Id. at 68. 
190 Orin Kerr, Compelled Decryption and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 97 
TEX. L. REV. 767, 794 (2019). 
191 Id. 
192 Id. at 783. 
193 Id. at 794. 
194 Id. at 796. 
195 Unlocking the Fifth Amendment, supra note 181, at 250–51. 
196 Id. 
197 Price & Simonetti, supra note 21, at 42. 
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defendant’s sole ownership and dominion over the device as well as 
exclusive control and ownership of the files on the device.198 
 
III. SOLUTIONS FOR THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: SETTING BOUNDARIES FOR THE 
FOREGONE CONCLUSION DOCTRINE 
A. Stop Stahl-ing: The Future of the Fifth Amendment 
Ideally, legislature should establish guidelines to provide the 
proper balance of protecting criminal defendants from compelled 
decryption in the scenarios where the act of decryption retains its 
testimonial nature and is not a foregone conclusion. However, in the 
absence of such efforts, the Supreme Court should grant certiorari 
to the next case on topic to clarify the doctrine. 
1. Take a Case-by-Case Approach 
It must be determined what the act of decryption communicates. 
Realistically, the act of decryption communicates different things in 
different scenarios. As Professor Sacharoff points out this may de-
pend upon what the government is looking to gain from the com-
pelled decryption.199 A different analysis may be necessary when 
the government knows the digital device has been used for illegal 
activity and seeks to confirm ownership; or when the government is 
seeking evidence from the device; or when the government is seek-
ing content on the device to lead to a different source of evidence. 
A case-by-case approach is superior to Professor Kerr’s sugges-
tion for a bright line rule because the foregone conclusion may apply 
differently in different scenarios. Kerr’s recommendation for a 
bright line rule rests on his assertion that unlocking a device only 
implicitly communicates knowledge of the password.200 This disre-
gards the other testimonial qualities of decryption such as dominion 
over the phone, ownership of the files on the phone and the authen-
ticity of the files.201 Stahl’s assertion that passwords are self-
 
198 Id. 
199 What Am I Really Saying, supra note 179, at 67. 
200 Kerr, supra note 192, at 779. 
201 What Am I Really Saying, supra note 179, at 67. 
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authenticating202 is an indication that the courts will utilize the pass-
word’s entry to communicate more than mere knowledge of the 
password. Cases may occur where decryption of the password will 
only reveal knowledge of the password. However, a one-size fits all 
approach misses the mark of preventing criminal defendants from 
having to provide testimony against themselves. 
2. Passwords Are Vehicles, They Are Not the Foregone 
Evidence 
The Court should find that passwords are not evidence but rather 
a means to obtain the evidence. The foregone conclusion should not 
apply to passwords because it is not the evidence the government 
seeks.203 The concept of passwords is not new to Fifth Amendment 
jurisprudence. Both the Doe204 and Hubbell205 cases acknowledged 
passwords can come between the government and evidence but felt 
that while physical keys can be surrendered, cognitively memorized 
combinations cannot be compelled. The holding in Hubbell turned 
on the fact that the government could not independently state what 
papers it sought.206 The Court felt the government should have pro-
vided a specific demand, guiding the defendant to the documents 
they sought, to show they already knew of these documents to war-
rant their surrender.207 The foregone conclusion doctrine is sup-
posed to apply to evidence that the government already knows 
about, thereby removing the sting of compelling the defendant to 
provide it to the government. If the government merely has to know 
that the defendant has the password to their own phone in order to 
be able to compel him/her to provide it so they can search for evi-
dence, that is likely to leave quite the sting. 
This protection is especially important for crimes where posses-
sion of certain digital content is an element of the crime, as opposed 
to when the government is seeking evidence that helps investigate a 
different crime. For crimes where possession of digital content is an 
 
202 State v. Stahl, 206 So. 3d 124, 136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016). 
203 G.A.Q.L. v. State, 257 So. 3d 1058, 1063 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018). 
204 Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 n.9 (1988). 
205 United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 43 (2000). 
206 Id. at 44–45. 
207 Id. 
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element of a crime, the foregone conclusion exception must be used 
even more stringently and only once the government can show, from 
an independent source, that the defendant is guilty. Perhaps for such 
crimes, compelling the individual to open their phone should only 
be used for sentencing purposes. 
3. Criminal Defendants Are Entitled to the Proper 
Functioning of Both the Fourth & Fifth Amendment 
The boundaries of the Fourth and Fifth Amendment should not 
be blurred. While the Fourth Amendment is concerned with pri-
vacy,208 the Fifth Amendment is concerned with avoiding compul-
sion leading to the cruel trilemma.209 Despite the challenges of ob-
taining evidence in modern society and for modern crimes, the au-
tonomy to not be coerced to implicitly say “I did it” by actions is not 
merely an added inconvenience to Fourth Amendment searches. 
Careful consideration of, among other things, all the possible testi-
monial qualities that can be expressed, the way data is stored, the 
types of information that can be stored without the user’s 
knowledge, and the evidentiary methods by which files can be au-
thenticated and assigned to the users, is necessary to determine the 
impact of new technology on the doctrine’s application to the rights 
of criminal defendants. Fifth Amendment protections must prevail 
as long as the compelled action provides any testimony. Therefore, 
compelled decryption must be subject to the extra burden of the el-
ements of the foregone conclusion doctrine. Professor Kerr and Pro-
fessor Sacharoff diverged on the topic of how these two amend-
ments are both at work.  
a) Taking the Fourth Amendment Too Far 
Professor Kerr argues that if the government can show that the 
suspect knows their password, then there should be no Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against compelled decryption.210 Kerr reasons that 
defendants should not be permitted to employ the Fifth Amendment 
as an additional burden to the government’s Fourth Amendment 
 
208 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 400 (1976). 
209 Id.; Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 596–97 (1990). 
210 Kerr, supra note 192, at 783. 
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burdens of finding probable cause and acquiring a search warrant.211 
Kerr states that if the government can show that the phone is in the 
defendant’s possession and the phone responds to a phone number 
known to belong to the defendant, then the foregone conclusion 
should apply.212 
This does not reach the level of particularity that the Supreme 
Court has utilized in prior Fifth Amendment cases considering the 
testimoniality of producing incriminating evidence. So far, the three 
Supreme Court cases on point consist of two occasions where the 
government acquired the documents they sought from a third 
party,213 and therefore, did not require the defendant to provide evi-
dence against himself, and more recently, where the Court decided 
not to expand the doctrine to avoid governmental overreach when 
they could not specify what evidence they wanted.214 The govern-
ment must therefore, carry a heavier burden than showing the de-
fendant possessed the digital device. 
One way to think about the divide between the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment in the context of compelled production is the difference 
between the government’s right to take and the right to demand the 
defendant to provide. If the government has probable cause and can 
obtain a proper warrant, they are entitled to take possession of, or 
seize, and search according to the parameters set forth on the war-
rant.215 But this is entirely distinct from what the government can 
demand the defendant to provide. The government is not prohibited 
per se from demanding evidence from the defendant, but the gov-
ernment is limited from demanding anything that is testimonial or 
would provide the government with more than what they previously 
had.216 This is tricky because the evidence itself is not protected,217 
it is the potential communication that is communicated when 
 
211 Id. at 788. 
212 Id. at 783. 
213 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409 (serving summonses on the attorneys of the individuals under 
investigation by the IRS); Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 215 (1988) (seeking to 
obtain a consent directive from defendant to obtain account records from the banks). 
214 United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 44–45 (2000). 
215 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762 (1969). 
216 Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 34. 
217 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 407. 
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providing the evidence that is protected for its testimonial poten-
tial.218 The foregone conclusion doctrine arose to shrink this protec-
tion in instances when the production of the demanded evidence 
would not be testimonial.219 This prevents the defendant from pro-
tecting evidence once the government already has some level of 
knowledge from an independent source that the evidence exists.220 
Herein lies the value of the elements of the foregone conclusion 
doctrine. The government should not be able to guess that evidence 
is likely to exist and demand it. For the government to assert that the 
defendant must provide self-incriminating evidence against their 
will, the government must carry the burden of showing they knew 
of this evidence anyway.221 This reduces the sting of being forced to 
testify against yourself; the government already knew you had this 
evidence, so providing it minimizes what you must do against your 
free will. 
Kerr’s comparison to the law enforcement officers that have a 
search warrant to search a house therefore does not work.222 He 
never asserts that encrypting one’s digital devices is wrong or illegal 
in any way.223 If people can encrypt their devices, then even if this 
seems like a nuisance on top of the Fourth Amendment, the ability 
to decrypt digital devices is merely a consequence of the advance-
ment of technology. And while encryption is utilized for privacy 
purposes, and therefore, would seem at first blush to be a Fourth 
Amendment problem,224 the modern reality is that this is something 
the government has to demand from the defendant. Being that the 
act of decryption can be communicative, this brings in the Fifth 
Amendment.225 Decryption creates a practical and legal wedge be-
tween the government’s possession of the device and the govern-
ment’s possession of the data on the device. This is true despite the 
fact that if encryption did not exist, then the government would not 
 
218 Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 36. 
219 Id. at 44. 
220 Id. at 44–45. 
221 Id. at 45. 
222 Kerr, supra note 192, at 794. 
223 See generally id. at 767. 
224 Id. at 787. 
225 What Am I Really Saying, supra note 179, at 67. 
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need the defendant’s assistance. Perhaps if encryption did not exist, 
people would not utilize their devices the same way and such evi-
dence would not exist. 
Additionally, Kerr’s approach does not consider the full poten-
tial for “implicit statements of fact” that decryption might convey, 
aside from knowledge of the password.226 Decryption also implies 
dominion over and possession of the device as well as access and 
possibly ownership over the evidence on the device.227 These impli-
cations make decryption testimonial,228 which makes it important to 
examine every situation individually and consider all possible im-
plications. The protections of the Fifth Amendment must apply if 
decryption communicates something that the government did not 
previously know. 
b) Restricting the Fourth Amendment Too Much 
Professor Sacharoff’s approach, by contrast, shortchanges the 
Fourth Amendment. He recommends that in compelled decryption 
cases, a potential solution against overbroad requests would be to 
limit the defendant’s compelled decryption of the device to only pro-
vide the government access to the specific files the government can 
independently describe with reasonable particularity.229 According 
to Sacharoff, this hybrid approach harmonizes the values of both the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments rather than pitting them against each 
other.230 Sacharoff acknowledges that this approach suffers short-
comings related to sentencing for possession-based crimes231 but 
notes that it offers definite Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections 
through its “antifishing” limitations.232 
Using the foregone conclusion doctrine to limit governmental 
access to only specific files is expanding the reasonable particularity 
 
226 Id. at 70 (quoting Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 209 (1988)).  
227 Id. at 67. 
228 See id. at 70. 
229 See Unlocking the Fifth Amendment, supra note 181, at 250–51. 
230 See id. at 245. 
231 See id. at 239–44 (noting that for possession-based crimes, the amount of illicit 
content may be a consideration in sentencing, such that limiting the government’s access 
to the files it was able to describe independently may provide the defendant with a lower 
sentence than they actually deserve). 
232 Id. at 245. 
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standard too far by requiring too much specificity. This is true be-
cause Sacharoff’s proposal limits the government’s ability to ac-
quire evidence to the specific files that it must already know of.233 
Fisher permitted the government to request documents as unspeci-
fied as “[r]etained copies of reports and other correspondence be-
tween Tannebaum Bindler & Lewis and Dr. E. J. Mason during 
1969, 1970 and 1971.”234 While some of the documents demanded 
in Fisher were referred to specifically, the above-quoted demand 
lacks specificity on what “reports and other correspondences” might 
refer to other than a footnote that narrowed this demand to “original 
letters sent from the accountant to the taxpayer.”235 This demand 
lacks specificity and is capable of referring to a small range of con-
tent, rather than one specific document, which shows that Fisher did 
not expect the foregone conclusion doctrine to limit the government 
in such an exacting manner. 
Sacharoff’s approach will not work for all the situations in which 
such compulsion orders can arise. The government could be seeking 
pictures saved to or created on the device, an audio clip from a 
longer recording, documents created or downloaded on the device 
or sections of a document, text messages, phone call history, social 
media access, browsing history, other internet engagement infor-
mation, global positioning system information, etc.  
Alternatively, the government could be seeking to determine if the 
defendant deleted files, whether the device utilizes a certain appli-
cation or program, or how many times the defendant accessed a cer-
tain application or program. The government may seek metadata, 
which has to be handled delicately because metadata is easily altered 
through normal usage of the device or retrieval of files.236 For some 
of these potential types of evidence, it is not a specific file that the 
government seeks. It could be the data about the file, the lack of the 
file, only a selected portion of the file, information about the appli-
cations or programs on the device, etc. In such circumstances, a rule 
 
233 Id. 
234 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 394 (1976). 
235 Id. at 413 n.13. 
236 See Justin Boncaldo, DFS 8: Metadata in Forensics, BONCALDO’S FORENSICS BLOG, 
https://boncaldoforensics.wordpress.com/2019/02/16/dfs-8-metadata-in-forensics/ 
[https://perma.cc/U9MC-3E8T].  
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that requires the government to have specific knowledge to describe 
a file may place information off-limits to the government in a way 
that Fisher is not likely to have intended. 
This approach also does not explain the extent to which the gov-
ernment must be able to describe the file it seeks. How would a sit-
uation be handled if the government has a witness that saw an illicit 
photo of a child on the defendant’s device, but upon opening the 
device, the defendant has multiple photos that fit the description? 
The question then becomes which photo does the government get. 
Sacharoff’s approach is oversimplified and would prove clunky in 
practice.  
Additionally, while the desire to protect against overzealous fo-
rensic investigations is appreciable, the Fifth Amendment is not the 
right “place” for these concerns. This approach risks conflating the 
values of two amendments. The Fifth Amendment is not supposed 
to prevent fishing expeditions, as the Fifth Amendment does not 
protect privacy or evidence.237 The Fifth Amendment protects 
against the testimonial nature of producing evidence.238 The Fourth 
Amendment is supposed to manage privacy concerns by limiting the 
government’s search of a seized device as prescribed by the search 
warrant.239 When the privacy amendment itself is inadequate to pre-
vent governmental fishing expeditions240 another amendment can-
not solve the problem. Once the foregone conclusion applies by the 
government’s showing of independent knowledge, by reasonable 
particularity, of the files it seeks from the device, it is up to the pro-
tections of the Fourth Amendment to take over and limit the search 
to what is outlined on the search warrant. This is where Kerr’s house 
comparison comes in;241 once the government has access, we must 
trust that they will abide by the warrant. The Fifth Amendment is 
not a guardian to prevent abuses of the Fourth Amendment. 
 
237 See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 407. 
238 See id. 
239 See Kerr, supra note 192, at 788. 
240 See Unlocking the Fifth Amendment, supra note 181, at 251. 
241 See Kerr, supra note 192, at 794. 
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4. Define the Standard of the Foregone Conclusion Doctrine 
The Supreme Court needs to clarify what the reasonable partic-
ularity standard applies to. Aside from the lack of clarity regarding 
the level of certainty required to show reasonable particularity, it is 
also unclear what the government must show this standard in rela-
tion to. Reasonable particularity could apply to how specifically the 
government must be able to describe the evidence that it is seek-
ing.242 Alternatively, reasonable particularity could refer to the gov-
ernment’s level of certainty of the existence, location, and authen-
ticity of the evidence it seeks.243 
The reasonable particularity standard should apply to the gov-
ernment’s ability to show, with some level of certainty, their prior 
knowledge that relevant evidence exists. Requiring the government 
to be too specific in describing the evidence they are seeking will 
lead to a rule that is only applicable in some circumstances.244 In 
Fisher, the government knew the types of documents they sought 
but they did not know enough to specifically describe each individ-
ual document.245 If the level of specificity with which the govern-
ment must demand particular pieces of evidence is too high, then the 
doctrine will lose its value to the government. Since the evidence 
itself is not protected, they need not already know the specifics of 
what the evidence will provide, but the government must know that 
it is exists, its location, and that it is authentic. 
Considering this issue from the opposite perspective, in Stahl’s 
case, the government would have easily been able to describe what 
they expected to find on his iPhone by the nature of the crime he 
was accused of.246 They were seeking files showing that he took in-
appropriate video and/or photographic content of a female customer 
in a store because that is the crime he was accused of.247  In order 
for the government’s burden to have any meaning under such 
 
242 See id. at 775. 
243 See id. 
244 See supra Section g) 
245 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 394 (1976) (seeking to obtain several types of 
tax documents, reports, and related correspondences between the taxpayers and their 
accountants).  
246 See generally State v. Stahl, 206 So. 3d 124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016). 
247 Id. at 129. 
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circumstances, the government must show their investigative work 
provided them with some level of independent prior knowledge of 
the existence, location, and authenticity of the evidence they seek. 
5. Clarify the Elements of the Foregone Conclusion Doctrine 
The Supreme Court should also clarify whether or not posses-
sion falls within the elements of the foregone conclusion. Some 
courts have used possession as interchangeable with the location el-
ement.248 This confusion stems from the fact that Fisher lists three 
ways the act of production could be communicative: (1) by admit-
ting possession, (2) control, and (3) the existence of the produced 
items.249 However, subsequent courts have confused these three 
communicative aspects of production with the three elements the 
government must show to carry its burden for application of the 
foregone conclusion doctrine: (1) existence, (2) location, and (3) au-
thenticity.250 
Possession, or more precisely dominion, should only be a com-
ponent of the locational element. If the government cannot inde-
pendently show that the defendant has some level of control over the 
device, then the government cannot threaten a contempt order to 
force defendant to open the device. However, this is not the sole 
burden of the location element; the government cannot merely state 
that they believe evidence to be “on defendant’s digital device.” The 
government retains the responsibility of producing some other in-
formation to prove that they have prior independent knowledge that 
a specified location on the device contains the evidence that govern-
ment already knows, with reasonable particularity, to exist on the 
device. The locational element of the foregone conclusion carries 
the potential to be the proper place to address the “antifishing” 
Fourth Amendment concern251 expressed by some scholars. A well 
outlined search warrant stating precisely how the device will be 
searched could constitute the locational element of the foregone 
conclusion doctrine and be the mechanism for harmonizing the 
 
248 See In re Single-Family Home & Attached Garage, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170184, 
at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 21, 2017). 
249 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410. 
250 See Stahl, 206 So. 3d 124, 130. 
251 See Unlocking the Fifth Amendment, supra note 181, at 245. 
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Fourth and Fifth Amendment without losing the values behind either 
of them. 
6. Protect the Authenticity Element of the Foregone 
Conclusion Doctrine 
The Supreme Court should call out Stahl’s rejection of the need 
to authenticate digital content. If the password self-authenticates the 
contents of the device, then providing the password becomes testi-
monial by communicating the authenticity of the contents of the de-
vice.252 To maintain Stahl’s self-authenticating password proposal, 
the government would have to independently prove authenticity of 
the content on the device prior to compelling the defendant to de-
crypt the device.253 While authenticity has a low standard254 as its 
“burden of proof is slight,”255 authenticity should still be a valid ev-
identiary objection for defendants. 
B. Biometrics Are Not Physical Acts, They Are Passwords! 
Biometric decryption has taken a hard hit in modern Fifth 
Amendment jurisprudence.256 However, the Supreme Court should 
contemplate the value of considering all encryption formats the 
same. The fact that biometrics are not contents of the mind does not 
mean biometric decryption cannot be testimonial. 
It seems arbitrary and inequitable that an exception to the Fifth 
Amendment which prevents an individual from being compelled to 
unlock their device is afforded to those who use an alphanumeric 
passcode but not to those who use face ID or fingerprints to encrypt 
 
252 Stahl, 206 So. 3d at 136 (stating that the technology and the password are self-
authenticating but this was based on the court’s presumption that the password was what 
the foregone conclusion applied to rather than the contents of the device). 
253 See Kerr, supra note 192, at 773–74. 
254 See United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 328–29 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting United 
States v. Goichman, 547 F.2d 778, 784 (3d Cir. 1976)) (“The showing of authenticity is 
not on a par with more technical evidentiary rules….The only requirement is that there has 
been substantial evidence from which they could infer that the document was authentic.”). 
255 McQueeney v. Wilmington Tr. Co., 779 F.2d 916, 928 (3d Cir. 1985). 
256 See In re Search Warrant Application, 279 F. Supp. 3d 800, 801 (N.D. Ill. 2017); 
Matter of White Google Pixel 3 XL Cellphone in a Black Incipio Case, 398 F. Supp. 3d 
785 (D. Idaho 2019); Commonwealth v. Baust, 89 Va. Cir. 267, 267 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2014); 
United States v. Barrera, 415 F. Supp. 3d 832, 842 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 22, 2019). 
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their devices. Creating a Fifth Amendment distinction based on the 
format of decryption will create inequitable results for defendants 
that do not know that biometric decryption means their bodies can 
be used against them if the government wants access to their device. 
If no bright line rule is established on this matter, newer formats 
of encryption will lead to unpredictable holdings. What about un-
lock patterns?257 Unlock patterns represent both physical gestures 
and the memory of the user. Figuring out whether such a decryption 
method is a mental exercise or a physical action would be a waste 
of court time. With rapid technological advancements, we do not 
know what will come next. The legal system should strive to en-
courage innovation of technology rather than stifling it with the fear 
that new technology will expose individuals to differential rights. “It 
has been repeatedly decided that [the Fifth Amendment] should re-
ceive a liberal construction, so as to prevent stealthy encroach-
ment.”258 
Moreover, one of Doe’s subtler footnotes paves the groundwork 
for understanding the difference between physical acts of being the 
evidence and being compelled to perform actions that leads to evi-
dence.259 Decrypting a device regardless of format is an additional 
step towards providing evidence against oneself. A defendant 
should not be compelled to provide the government with access to 
self-incriminating evidence unless it is actually a foregone conclu-
sion. Therefore, the Court should distinguish decryption by biomet-
rics from the physical acts of actually being the evidence, such as by 
providing blood samples or voice exemplars.260 
Furthermore, in Matter of Residence of Oakland,261 the court 
noted that biometrics are functionally the same as passwords 
 
257 An unlock pattern requires tracing a prespecified number of points which forms a 
pattern that unlocks the device. 
258 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 417 (1976) (quoting Gouled v. United States, 
255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921)). 
259 Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 211 n.10 (1988) (“[T]he Court distinguished 
between the suspect’s being compelled himself to serve as evidence and the suspect’s being 
compelled to disclose or communicate information or facts that might serve as or lead to 
incriminating evidence.”). 
260 See State v. Diamond, 890 N.W.2d 143, 150 (Ct. App. Minn. 2017). 
261 In re Search of a Residence in Oakland, 354 F. Supp. 3d 1010 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
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because various security features of most cell phones can render bi-
ometric access functionless, necessitating password entry to open 
the device.262 While providing fingerprints may have once been 
merely a physical act for identifying the defendant, the legal system 
must reexamine its understanding of this action now that finger-
prints can provide “a direct link to communicative, as well as poten-
tially incriminating information.”263 The same is true for other for-
mats of biometric decryption. 
Courts cannot ignore the communicative nature of biometric de-
cryption. Once the device perceives the unique combination of phys-
iological features of the device owner’s face or fingerprint, it pro-
vides the user-chosen password264 to decrypt the key which in turn 
decrypts the device. Biometric decryption identifies the encrypted 
device’s owner by responding to their unique physiological features. 
Unlike a password-protected phone, biometric decryption typically 
can only be accomplished by the person with the specific features 
the encryption was established with.265 This is communicative that 
the individual that biometrically decrypts the phone is likely the only 
person with control over the device and its contents. Password pro-
tected devices allow anyone who knows the password to utilize the 
device. Regardless of the format of encryption, decrypting the de-
vice still concedes the defendant possessed and controlled the device 
and its contents. The communication of confirming the owner’s 
identity, sole access, and dominion over the device and its files 
makes compelled biometric decryption testimonial, unless the de-
vice’s contents are otherwise a foregone conclusion. Therefore, bi-
ometric decryption should not flippantly be categorized as an unpro-
tected physical act under the Fifth Amendment. 
C. The Problems 
Some speculate that stringent Fifth Amendment protections will 
lead the government to rely more heavily on the workaround 
 
262 Id. at 1015–16 (quoting the government’s own concession that when the phone has 
been turned off, restarted, inactive, or has not been unlocked for a certain amount of time, 
only the password will open the device). 
263 See Goldman, supra note 8, at 211. 
264 See Price & Simonetti, supra note 21, at 42.  
265 See Jenkins, supra note 126. 
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methods of the Fourth Amendment, such as increased surveil-
lance.266 Such a threat is a viable concern, but the fact that the gov-
ernment can impede one right does not mean we should not protect 
another. The focus of this Note is to argue for strict adherence to the 
spirit of the Fifth Amendment; however, the Court may find that this 
sets a burden that is too high for the government in fighting certain 
possession-based digital crimes which the government has an unde-
niably strong interest in fighting, such as child pornography. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Currently, the foregone conclusion doctrine requires some clar-
ification. The Supreme Court must address several issues in order to 
provide equitable and consistent results across all U.S. cases. Dif-
ferent scenarios will require a customized approach to address the 
particular potential implicit testimonial communications of each sit-
uation. Courts must acknowledge that passwords are not evidence, 
but a vehicle to access evidence. The Fourth and Fifth Amendment 
must be seen individually for the unique protections they each pro-
vide to criminal defendants. The foregone conclusion doctrine must 
be developed to determine when it applies, to what it applies to, the 
appropriate standard for its application, and what burden each ele-
ment poses to the government. Biometrics should be treated the 
same as alphanumeric passwords under the law because of the testi-
monial features of compelled biometric decryption and to avoid dis-
parate treatment under the law. The spirit of the bill of rights’ pro-
tection of criminal defendants must be preserved. Ultimately, the 
challenges posed to law enforcement by the advancement in tech-
nology does not justify abridging a criminal defendant’s Fifth 
Amendment right.  
 
266 See Caren Myers Morrison, The Intersection of Facebook and the Law: Symposium 
Article: Passwords, Profiles, and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Facebook and 
the Fifth Amendment, 65 ARK. L. REV. 133, 158 (2012). 
